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THE UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING STATUTES:
CAN A TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED
STATES BE BOTH "FREE" AND FAIR? A CASE
STUDY OF CHILE
Andrea Miller'
On June 6, 2003, the U.S. Government and the Government of the
Republic of Chile signed the United States-Chile FTA.' The purpose of
the accord was to "[avoid] distortions in their reciprocal trade; . . .
[enhance] the competitiveness of their firms in global markets; . . . [and
contribute] to hemispheric integration and the fulfillment of the
objectives of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.",2 Nevertheless, in
light of U.S. antidumping laws which impose duties upon foreign imports
sold for less than their home market price, these stated goals are
arguably illusory. Moreover, given the significant negative economic
impact that U.S. antidumping investigations have on the economy of
+ B.A., University of Washington, 1998; J.D., Catholic University of America, 2005. The
author would like to thank her family for their steady support. The author would also like
to thank Professor Shelby Quast and the editors of the Catholic University Law Review for
their insight and editorial assistance.
1. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
108-77, § 101, 117 Stat. 909, 910 (2003). See generally OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http:/www.ustr.govFrade-Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/Final_
Texts/SectionIndex.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2004), for the full text of the United States-
Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
2. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, pmbl.,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assetsFrradeAgreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/Final_
Texts/asset-upload file535 3989.pdf. The FOREIGN TRADE INFO. SYS., http://
www.sice.oas.org/tradee.asp (last visited Dec. 22, 2004), provides links to the full text
version of many bilateral trade agreements, including the United States-Chile FTA. See
generally OFFICE FOR TRADE, GROWTH & COMPETITIVENESS, PUBLICATIONS &
STUDIES, http://www.sice.oas.org/tunit/pubinfoe.asp (last visited Dec. 22, 2004), for a
collection of Organization of American States (OAS) trade unit studies, many of which
are available (in pdf and Word format).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000). The statute, in relevant part, states that if
the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign
merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its
fair value . . .there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount
by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export
price) for the merchandise.
Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined "fair value" to be prices not
"below [those which] the foreign manufacturers charge for the same products in their
home markets." Torrington Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347. 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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developing countries and the United States' frequent use of antidumping
measures, the question arises: can free trade with Chile be fair?4 The
importance of the response to that question is highlighted by the United
States' present interest in the Free Trade of the Americas negotiations,
the success of which will be affected by the Latin American perception of
the United States in terms of their desirability as a co-member to a
regional free trade agreement.5
The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is scheduled to
become effective in early 2004.6 The FTA will represent the United
States' first comprehensive trade agreement with a South American
country. The agreement liberalizes trade between the two countries by
cutting tariffs and "reduc[ing] barriers for services., 8 Additionally, the
FTA "protects leading-edge intellectual property, keeps pace with new
technologies, ensures regulatory transparency and provides effective
labor and environmental enforcement."9  Chapter 8 of the agreement,
Trade Remedies, addresses antidumping measures, and requires that
both countries adhere to terms set forth by the World Trade
4. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE U.S.-CHILE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY ISSUES 11-12 (2003), available at
http://www.uschamber.comlNRrdonlyres/e3fq6svbb3yv5swkdhvc5shw5llpig6n67vsw4duu
5zyyym3xbv4f2mrjvrvytoy4xirpwz2xlqtin7wzq2zz22ec/crsftaO3O2O3.pdf. Hornbeck noted
that "Chile maintained that its sensitivity to United States antidumping investigations was
based on their 'frequent and at times unjustified use,' and argued that just the filing of
dumping charges initiated a process with significant unrecoverable costs regardless of the
investigation's outcome." Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
5. JOs TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR., LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTERFACES
BETWEEN ANTIDUMPING AND COMPETITION POLICY, http://www.netamericas.net/
Researchpapers/Documents/Tavares/tavares6.doc (Dec. 2001).
[W]hile the improvement of multilateral rules on antidumping will certainly
facilitate regional negotiations, it will be insufficient for the FTAA process,
wherein the parties will need additional disciplines for eliminating the use of
antidumping as surrogate safeguards
. . . [A]t the hemispheric level, antidumping is a serious threat . . . to the
integration process itself.
Id. More broadly, the United States-Chile FTA has been praised for the political and
economic advantages it can provide in a larger geographic context. See HORNBECK, supra
note 4, at 2. Advocates responded to criticism of the FTA by groups generally concerned
about the environmental and labor issues that arise in trade arrangements by pointing out
that the FTA "offered both economic and political gains, with Chile seen as a potential
strategic foothold in South America, a region historically linked closely with Europe and
Asia." Id.; see also TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR., supra.
6. § 101,117 Stat. at 910-11. See infra Part V.
7. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. and Chile
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Organization (WTO) Agreement. ° Where a product is determined to
have been dumped, the importing member's authorities decide whether
to impose an antidumping duty upon the import; this duty would remain
in force long enough to offset the injury-causing activity." Thus, under
the FTA, where Chilean exporters allegedly have sold products to the
United States for less than their domestic price, the U.S. antidumping
statutes serve as the operative law.
12
The antidumping statutes are found within the Tariff Act of 1930.13
The statutes lay out the numerous steps involved in the imposition of
antidumping duties, from the procedures for initiating an investigation to
payment of an antidumping duty. 4 Once the Department of Commerce,
or an "interested party," initiates an antidumping investigation, the
International Trade Commission (ITC) makes an initial determination as
to whether the complainant has established a prima facie case for the
imposition of an antidumping duty. 5 Provided no extensions occur, the
10. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2, ch. 8, § B, art. 8.8, $1 1,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/Final_
Texts/asset-upload file545_4002.pdf.
11. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. IX, para. 9.1, art. XI, para. 11.1, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
Annex IA, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/19-adp.pdf.
12. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000).
13. Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
14. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a, 1673e-1673g (2000).
15. Id. §§ 1673a, 1677 (discussing procedures for initiating an antidumping duty
investigation). The statute provides that
[t]he term "interested party" means-
(A) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States
importer...
(B) the government of a country in which such merchandise is produced or
manufactured or from which such merchandise is exported,
(C) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a
domestic like product,
(D) a certified union or recognized union or group of workers which is
representative of an industry...
(E) a trade or business association a majority of whose members
manufacture, produce, or wholesale a domestic like product in the United States,
(F) an association, a majority of whose members is composed of interested
parties described in subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) with respect to a domestic like
product, and
(G) in any investigation under this subtitle involving an industry engaged in
producing a processed agricultural product, as defined in paragraph (4)(E), a
coalition or trade association which is representative of either-
(i) processors,
(ii) processors and producers, or
(iii) processors and growers ....
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normal investigation process will conclude within 185 days. 16 However,
according to the ITC, an antidumping investigation can last up to 420
days, not including administrative reviews. 7 For a developing country,
even if the court finds favorably and does not impose a dumping duty,
the litigation costs of a year-and-a-half long trial can prove economically
devastating.'8 In light of the fact that antidumping measures do not exist
in the Chile-Canada Free Trade Agreement,' 9 one might question their
necessity in the context of trade between the United States and Chile.0
Id. § 1677(9). As a general rule, the commission will find a prima facie case of dumping
that warrants the imposition of a duty where "(A) an industry in the United States (i) is
materially injured, or (ii) is threatened with material injury, or (B) the establishmcnt of an
industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of the subject
merchandise and that imports of the subject merchandise are not negligible." Id. §
1673b(a)(1).
16. Id. §§ 1673a-1673b. First, within twenty days of filing the petition, an initial
determination is made as to whether all of the necessary elements are present for the
imposition of an antidumping duty. Id. § 1673a(c)(1)(A). Provided the determination is
affirmative, within forty-five days of filing the petition it must be determined whether
there is reasonable indication of injury. Id. § 1673b(a)(2)(A)(i). If the finding is
affirmative, the antidumping investigation must conclude within 140 days. Id. §
1673b(b)(1)(A).
17. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, STATUTORY TIMETABLES FOR ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVESTIGATIONS, available at http://www.usitc.gov/
trade-remedy731-ad 701_cvdfTIMETABL.PDF (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (providing a
step-by-step explanation of how an antidumping investigation might last up to 420 days).
According to the OAS, the maximum length of antidumping duty investigations in the
United States is 407 days, and antidumping administrative reviews can last up to 545 days.
FOREIGN TRADE INFORM. SYS., ORG. OF AM. STATES, COMPENDIUM OF ANTIDUMPING
AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
http://www.sice.oas.org/cp-adcvd/english/041000up.asp (last visited Dec. 22, 2004).
18. See Sidney Weintraub, The U.S.-Chile Connection, ISSUES INT'L POL. ECON. (Ctr.
for Strategic & Int'l Studies, Washington, D.C.), June 2001, available at
http://www.csis.org/simonchair/issues200106.pdf. In reference to the antidumping case
regarding Chilean table grapes initiated by the Growers League of Coachella Valley,
California in March 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studies pointed out
that although
[t]he U.S. International Trade Commission ... dismissed the dumping allegation,
.. the Chileans had to bear the cost of a legal defense. It was another example
that fortified the deep conviction in Latin America that competitive success in
the U.S. market will almost inexorably lead to antidumping charges, justified or
not.
Id.
19. Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order 13116
("Super 301"), 66 Fed. Reg. 23,064, 23,065 (May 7,2001).
20. Canada-Chile: Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 5, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1067, ch. M, art. M-
01. In relevant part, the Canada-Chile FTA states:
[E]ach Party agrees not to apply its domestic anti-dumping law to goods of the
other Party. Specifically:
(a) neither Party shall initiate any anti-dumping investigations or reviews
with respect to goods of the other Party;
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Assuming that total elimination of antidumping measures is not feasible
for trade between the United States and Chile, it is worth considering
changes to the investigation process for developing countries, and
particularly for Chile. This would reduce the hardship that developing
countries face in antidumping cases-costs which the United States
• • 21
would ultimately end up bearing due to the loss in trade opportunities.
Ironically, this fact was confirmed by the ITC itself, in "the most
complete study so far on the welfare impact of antidumping on the U.S.
economy., 22  Specifically, "[t]he study showed that removing the
antidumping and countervailing duties that were active in 1991 would
have allowed a welfare gain of US$1.6 billion, i.e., about 0.03 percent of
U.S. GDP in that year., 23 ITC Commissioners explained that the results
of the study did not impact the ITC's subsequent practice because the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws exist to protect producers, not
24
consumers -a response that has been challenged by the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative.
5
This Comment examines the prospect of free and fair trade with Chile
under the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement in light of the Title
19 antidumping statutes. This Comment first discusses the definition and
goals of free trade in general and then within the context of the U.S.-
(b) each Party shall terminate any ongoing anti-dumping investigations or
inquiries in respect of such goods;
(c) neither Party shall impose new anti-dumping duties or other measures in
respect of such goods; and
(d) each Party shall revoke all existing orders levying anti-dumping duties in
respect of such goods.
2. Each Party shall amend, and publish as appropriate, its relevant domestic anti-
dumping law in relation to goods of the other Party to ensure that the objectives
of this Article are achieved.
Id.
21. James Gathii, Fairness as Fidelity to Making the WTO Fully Respond to all its
Members, 97 AM. SOC'Y INTL L. PROC. 1-57, 163 (2003).
22. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR., supra note 5.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order 13166
("Super 301 "), 66 Fed. Reg. 23,064, 23,065 (May 7, 2001). The ITC expressed an arguably
narrow view of "protecting producers" in that while antidumping and countervailing duty
laws may protect producers in terms of "unfair competition," those producers are also
consumers-a point that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative made in stating that
"restrictions on trade have victims: farmers, school teachers, factory and office workers,
small business people, and many others who have to pay more for clothing or food or
homes or equipment because of visible and invisible taxes on trade." Id. Contra Note,
Rethinking the 1916 Antidumping Act, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1569 (1997) (arguing that
"the assumption that consumer gains from dumping outweigh domestic producer losses
depends on a narrow definition of producer losses that excludes any 'employee surplus' or
rents that are eliminated when domestic producers lay off employees").
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Chile FTA. This Comment then describes the United States'
antidumping statutes, provides a brief consideration of their merits, and
critiques the ways in which they conflict with the goals of free trade and
particularly with the United States-Chile FTA. This Comment looks at
the treatment of antidumping in the context of FTAs that the United
States and Chile have with other countries, and notes inconsistencies in
the treatment of antidumping under the United States-Chile FTA. Next,
this Comment examines trends in the Department of Commerce and the
ITC's treatment of antidumping cases, particularly those involving
Chilean exports to the United States, in order to illustrate the force and
application of the U.S. antidumping statutes. This Comment emphasizes
the relative importance such changes will have in finalizing the Free
Trade Area of the Americas. This Comment concludes that if the
conflict between the U.S. antidumping statutes and free trade with Chile
cannot be reconciled by an elimination of such laws, then perhaps
various changes to the U.S. administrative review process, including
improvements in the screening stage of antidumping actions brought
against Chilean exporters, can mitigate this tension.
I. UNITED STATES TREATMENT OF DUMPING IN RELATION TO FREE
TRADE WITH CHILE
A. Free Trade
Free trade has been defined as "trade based upon the unrestricted
international exchange of goods with tariffs used only as a source of
revenue not as instruments to influence the quantity, direction, or price
of goods traded. 2 6 Similarly, the U.S. Department of Commerce has
defined a free trade agreement as "an arrangement which establishes
unimpeded exchange and flow of goods and services between trading
partners regardless of national borders., 27 From such understandings of
"free trade," it follows that restrictive measures such as the U.S.
antidumping statutes go against the spirit of free trade and do not belong
in free trade agreements.
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative identified three principal
ways in which trade liberalization benefits America.2 First, the export
opportunities that come with expanded global trade support employment
26. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 907 (1993) (emphasis
added).
27. OFFICE OF ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL TRADE TERMS, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/lexcon.text (Sept. 1, 1995)
(emphasis added).
28. Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order, 66 Fed. Reg.
at 23,065.
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opportunities (an estimated twelve million jobs over the last decade).29
These employment opportunities directly fuel the U.S. economy." It is
estimated that trade expansion from the Uruguay Round and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) resulted in an increase from
$1260 to $2040 for an average family of four.31 Second, free trade has
positive social effects. 32 It "reduces government barriers and encourages
vibrant private and civic societies governed by the rule of law."33
Additionally, "[it] opens societies to people, to ideas, to debate, to
competition, and also to impartial transparent rules."' 3 Third, the U.S.
Trade Representative asserts that expanded trade strengthens homeland
security by disarming the hostility that arises from a protectionist
approach to trade.35
Opponents of free trade claim that it decreases job opportunities and
the standard of living for people in developing countries who cannot
compete with the low price of imports from developed countries 36
According to the WTO, however, free trade actually helps reduce
poverty by boosting the developing country's economy. In his speech to
the United Nations International Labour Organization of the WTO,
former Director General Mike Moore said that workers directly benefit
from free trade; it enables them to purchase goods at a lower cost while,
for many, a higher demand exists for their goods and services. 8
29. Id. This report also noted that "[elxports accounted for over one-quarter of U.S.
economic growth over the last decade." Id.
30. Id. The report stated that "[t]he expanding global trade and the expanding
economic growth in the United States are not coincidental; they are achieved in concert.
One strengthens and reinforces the other." Id.
31. Id.
32. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing





36. Chakravarthi Raghavan, More Losers Than Winners from WTO 's "Free Trade,"
TWN ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2001), at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/losers.htm.
37. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Free Trade Helps Reduce Poverty,
Says New WTO Secretariat Study (June 13, 2000), http://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/pres00_e/pr181_e.htm.
38. Mike Moore, How Trade Liberalisation Impacts Employment, Speech to the
International Labour Organization (Mar. 18, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/
news-e/spmm-e/spmm80-e.htm.
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B. Free Trade with Chile
1. A Brief History of the United States-Chile FTA
Chile initiated the first campaign for a Free Trade agreement between
Chile and the United States in 1990.29 Negotiations began against the
backdrop of President George H. W. Bush's "Americas Initiative," which
was a "prelude to the creation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) ... and ... the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA)."' In 2002, President Bush "signed into law fast track
. ..to negotiate future trade agreements, capping a lengthy and often
contentious debate in the 107th Congress.'" Some commentators
attribute this difficulty to discrepancies regarding the incorporation of
42labor and environmental provisions into the FTA. In addition, Chile's
reservations about U.S. antidumping legislation likely added tension toS • 43
the negotiations. At a recent WTO Negotiating Group on Rules
session, a Chilean official stated that with respect to the United States'
use of trade-distortive practices, "'even for Chile, antidumping measures
themselves are trade-distorting." '44 Despite such reservations, however,
39. CHILE FOREIGN INV. COMM., CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES: A
PARTNERSHIP FOR GROWTH 10 (2004), available at http://www.foreigninvestment.cl/
publications/libro-chileusa/CHILEUS.pdf. The Foreign Investment Committee's website
is available at http://www.foreigninvestment.cl. Negotiations were described as follows:
"We were like annoying flies in a room," says Kathleen Barclay, former
AmCham President and a key figure in the US-Chile Free Trade Coalition,
formed with the American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America
(AACCLA) and the US Chamber of Commerce. "We just wouldn't go away, no
matter how often we were swatted."
Id.
40. Id.
41. CHARLES E. HANRAHAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AGRICULTURAL
TRADE ISSUES IN THE 107TH CONGRESS Summary (2003), available at http://www.
ncseonline.orgNLE/CRSreports/03Feb/IB10077.pdf; see infra note 45.
42. J.F. HORNBECK, CRS ISSUE BRIEF: THE U.S.-CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT,
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/6123.htm (last modified Mar. 5, 2001). A trade official commented
that
TPA, sometimes referred to as 'fast track,' is the legislative mechanism that gives
U.S. trade representatives essential credibility at the international negotiating
table. Absent TPA-an authority enjoyed by every president from Nixon to
Clinton until it expired in 1994-there will be few negotiations and no major
trade agreements.
Bill Center, Future Depends on Fast-Track Authority, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Sept. 7, 2001, http://www.wcit.org/topics/tpa/Center-ed.htm.
43. HORNBECK, supra note 42.
44. WTO Rules Negotiations: Deep Divides Prevail on Harmfulness of Fisheries
Subsidies, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Oct. 24, 2002, at 1, 2, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-10-24/2002BRIDGESWeekly36.pdf. The article also noted
that "Chile and Japan are both members of an informal coalition favouring tougher rules
[Vol. 54:627
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FTA negotiations continued and on June 6, 2003, Chile's Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Soledad Alvear, and the U.S. Trade Representative,
Robert Zoellick, signed the agreement.5 The finalization of the FTA
"emphasizes the Bush administration's intention to negotiate and
conclude trade pacts in Latin America." 46
2. What the United States Stands to Gain Through Free Trade with
Chile
Support for the U.S.-Chile FTA is widespread. 7 This is largely
because the estimated financial gains for both countries are great: a $700
million increase in Chile's annual GDP and a $400.2 billion jump for the
United States.48 Specific provisions of the agreement that support such
projections include (1) the immediate removal of tariffs for over eighty-
five percent of consumer and industrial products traded bilaterally, and
constraining the use of antidumping measures dubbed the 'Friends of Antidumping,'
which further comprises Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Mexico,
Norway, Singapore, Korea, Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey." Id.
45 See COUNTDOWN TO FTA IMPLEMENTATION, EXPORT.GOV, at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/chileFTA/timeline.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2004). December
11, 2002 marked the conclusion of the United States-Chile FTA-the result of two years
and fourteen rounds of talks. Id.
46. Dinah McDougall, U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, EXPORT AM., Feb. 2003, at
19, 20, available at http://www.export.gov/exportamerica/NewOpportunities/no us chile_
fta_0203.pdf.
47. On January 29, 2003, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce joined with the United
States-Chile Free Trade Coalition, a "broad-based group of U.S. companies and business
organizations." Press Release, The United States Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber
Joins in Launch of United States-Chile Free Trade Coalition (Jan 29, 2003), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2003/january/03-11.htm. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce grounded their approval of the liberalization of trade between Chile and the
United States in the facts that, in 2002, Chile was the "6th largest market for United States
exports in Latin America," and trade between the two countries reached $6.6 billion in
2001. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Welcomes U.S.-Chile
Trade Announcement-Support Pending Final Details, (Dec. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.uschamber.comlpress/releases/2002/december/02-214.htm; see also Press
Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Advisory Groups
Report on Singapore and Chile FTAs (Feb. 28, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2003/February/Trade AdvisoryGroupsReport on S
ingaporeChileFTAs.html (noting that reports from thirty-one trade advisory
committees, "comprising over 700 practitioners representing diverse interests and views,"
indicated wide support for the FTA).
48. See CHILE-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, RESEARCH, FACTS,
http://www.chileusafta.com/rsrch-facts.html (citing a University of Michigan study) (last
visited Oct. 9, 2003) (on file with the author); Press Release, HPG Worldwide, LLC, HPG
Signs Exclusive Distribution Agreement in Singapore (Oct. 4, 2004),
http://www.hpgroup.com/news.shtml (citing Rep. Philip Crane).
2005]
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(2) a phasing-out of most of the remaining tariffs within four years. 9 The
security the agreement offers investors, such as a strong legal framework
and anti-corruption measures in government contracting, will enhance
these direct economic gains. °
In addition to economic gains, the FTA promotes and enforces a
bilateral commitment to upholding domestic labor and environmental
laws." For example, "[clooperative projects will help protect wildlife,
reduce environmental hazards and promote internationally recognized
labor rights."52  Additionally, the FTA will enforce labor and
environmental obligations by utilizing "[a]n innovative enforcement
mechanism" that involves monetary assessments 3
The political benefits expected to result from the FTA are also
significant. In general terms, the FTA will provide an example for future
trade agreements.14  Specifically, "[it allows the United States and a
highly sophisticated trading partner to explore new issues and set
precedents that will be valuable in a wider arena."" More importantly,
the FTA may increase the likelihood that the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) will actualize-a common goal for both the United
States and Chile. 6
49. Press Release, supra note 7. Approximately seventy-five percent of farm goods
for both countries will be free of tariffs within four years, and all such tariffs will be
removed within twelve years, thus allowing the United States to gain new access to Chile's





54. See Edward Gresser, The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement. Concrete Benefits,
Strategic Value, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST., May 17, 2001, http://www.ppionline.org/
ppi-ci.cfm?knlgArealD=108&subseclD=127&contentlD=3369.
55. ld.
56. Id. Andr6s Bianchi, Ambassador of Chile stated that "in our view, an FTA
between Chile and the United States would benefit not only our two countries but would
also strengthen the process of establishing a Free Trade Area in the Americas." ANDRES
BIANCHI, GLOBAL Bus. DIALOGUE & NAT'L ASS'N OF MFRs., TOWARDS A CHILE-
UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 2 (2002).
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C. The U.S. Antidumping Statutes in Theory and Effect
1. U.S. Antidumping Law
a. Early Origins
Antidumping law in the United States began with the The Anti-
Dumping Act of 1916,"7 which "allows ... civil actions and criminal
proceedings to be brought against importers who have sold foreign-
produced goods in the United States at prices that are substantially less
than the prices at which the same products are sold in a relevant foreign
market," provided that the importer did so with malice. 8 The Act came
about as a reaction to the "fear that after the end of World War I
European-especially German-firms would try to regain their position
on the American market through predatory selling practices, thus
threatening the newly established preeminence of American
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (2000). Section 72 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any articles
from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and systematically to
import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the United States
at a price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of
such articles, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal
markets of the country of their production, or of other foreign countries to which
they are commonly exported after adding to such market value or wholesale
price, freight, duty, and other charges and expenses necessarily incident to the
importation and sale thereof in the United States: Provided, That such act or acts
be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States,
or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of
restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in
the United States.
Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person to
violate this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both, in the discretion of the court. Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of any violation of, or combination or conspiracy to violate,
this section, may sue therefore in the district court of the United States for the
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages
sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive the proper State
courts of jurisdiction in actions for damages thereunder.
Id. § 72.
58. PHILIP DE KEYSER, EXPLORING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN US ANTI-
DUMPING ACT 1916: AN EASY CASE? 1 (2001), available at http://
www.jeaimonnetprogram.org/papers/01/013101.rtf; see also CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., DUMPING OF EXPORTS AND ANTIDUMPING DUTIES: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 1 (2002).
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industries." 9 The 1916 Act remains on the books, but it rarely has been
used to punish the antitrust acts of importers. 6° In application, the
administrative approach set forth in the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921
superceded the 1916 Act.6' Like the 1916 Act, the 1921 Act "was enacted
'to prevent actual or threatened injury to a domestic industry resulting
from the sale in the U.S. market of merchandise at prices lower than in
the home market (country of origin).' 62 The 1930 Act, as amended,
maintained the 1921 Act's administrative structure whereby the
Department of Commerce and the ITC were charged with the evaluation
of the "interested party['s]" (which includes industry participants)
petition for an antidumping investigation, or the Department of
Commerce's initiation of the same, and ultimately decided whether an
63
antidumping duty is in order.
b. Support and Criticism for U.S. Antidumping Law
Those who support the use of antidumping measures are primarily
concerned with protecting U.S. producers. 6 Additionally, they claim that
"[tihe U.S.' antidumping law.., ensures 'fair trade' by offsetting market
distortions caused by foreign governments., 61 In particular, these
supporters of antidumping legislation fear that without such protection,
predatory pricing-"the intentional selling of a good at a price below the
cost of production with the intent of driving competitors out of business
and increasing the market power of the predatory firm"'-will occur to
59. DE KEYSER, supra note 58, at 2-3.
60. Id. De Keyser notes that
[a]lthough the 1916 Act has been on the books for more than eighty years, it was
rarely applied. There are no criminal cases under the 1916 Act reported. Before
1975 only one civil case was reported. Since 1975, the Act has known a little
'revival' and a modest jurisprudence emerged. However, none of the cases led to
the imposition of sanctions. This lack of success is attributed to the fact that the
required intent imposes a burden of proof on plaintiffs that is extremely difficult
to meet. A number of cases brought in recent years regarding steel imports, have
raised concerns that the Act is being used as a tool of intimidation to force
foreign competitors.
Id. at 3.
61. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1978) (repealed 1979).
62. Timken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221,223 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting J.C. Penney Co.
v. Dep't of the Treasury, 319 F. Supp. 1023, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 63 (2d
Cir. 1971)).
63. DE KEYSER, supra note 58, at 4.
64. See TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR., supra note 5.
65. BRINK LINDSEY, CATO INST., THE U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW RHETORIC VERSUS
REALITY 1 (1999), available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-007.pdf.
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the detriment of our economy. 6 Those against these laws focus their
criticism largely on the associated cost to consumers and the overall
negative effect on the U.S. economy-two aspects that arguably conflict
with the goals of free trade.67 An additional criticism of the United
States' antidumping law, one which goes to the heart of the supporters'
argument, is that the laws actually harm domestic producers because they
merely draw attention away from the important topic of why U.S.
industries are less competitive in the local industry.
68
2. The United States' Use of Antidumping Measures with Respect to
Latin America
Between 1987 and 2000, the United States initiated 782 antidumping
measures, 105 of which were directed against sixteen Latin American
66. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ANTIDUMPING ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
AROUND THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL DATA, at xi (1998), available
at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/4xx/doc439/antidump.pdf.
67. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR., supra note 5. ITC Commissioners Janet Nuzum and
David Rohr stated that
it must be remembered that the purpose of the antidumping ... laws is not to
protect consumers, but rather to protect producers. Inevitably, some cost is
associated with this purpose ... [slo it should not come as a surprise that the
economic benefits of the remedies accrue to producers, and the economic costs
accrue to consumers.
Id.; see supra Part I. A recent report for Congress "looked at data from 30 U.S.
antidumping actions between 1987 and 1992 and found that those duties reduced U.S.
economic welfare by $275 million annually. Further, for each $1.00 protected producers
gained from the trade barrier, U.S. consumers lost $3.20." ELWELL, supra note 58, at 11
(footnote omitted); see also JOSE TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., UNITED NATIONS,
ANTIDUMPING IN THE AMERICAS 8 (2001), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
geograph/antidumping/karsten.pdf. The authors argue that "[als practiced today ...
antidumping... entails heavy costs, for the foreign firms targeted by this policy, certainly,
but also for consumers in the country applying antidumping legislation." Id.; see also
Letter from George Green, Vice President, General Counsel, Food Marketing Institute, to
Donald Evans, Secretary of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce (May 3, 2001),
http://www.fmi.org/gr/comments/report.cfm?issuelD=350 (regarding the Spring Table
Grapes investigation). The letter stated that
[m]any FMI [Food Marketing Institutc-a non-profit association that conducts
programs in research, education, industry relations, and public affairs] members
believe that the presence of Chilean ... grapes in the United States marketplace
has not harmed United States interest but, instead has created a win-win
situation for both United States businesses and United States consumers. Given
the United States climate, domestic producers simply cannot supply grapes for
United States supermarket shelves year-round.
[I]f Chilean . . . grapes are effectively removed form the United States
marketplace by the application of future dumping duties, United States
consumers will pay a heavy price.
Id.
68. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 27.
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69Free Trade Area of the Americas countries. Only five of these were
against Chile.7 As of August 2003, the United States had forty-three
antidumping duty orders in place against Latin American FTAA
countries.1 Only two of these orders were against Chile, one for
imported mushrooms and the other for frozen raspberries."
D. Another Perspective: Antidumping in Chile and the United States'
Other Trade Agreements
While a majority of the regional agreements in the Western
Hemisphere permit antidumping measures, Chile is involved in a number
of trade agreements in which the member countries have agreed to
eliminate antidumping. The United States, however, consistently
adheres to the bilateral allowance of this protectionist measure in its free
trade agreements. 74 In the Chile-U.S. FIA, the standard United States•71
approach prevails.
1. Chile Abolishes Antidumping Measures in Its Trade Agreements
a. The Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement
The bilateral trade agreement between Canada and Chile, which went
into effect on July 15, 1997, contains a mutual exemption from the two
countries' antidumping laws.76  This step away from traditional
protectionism is particularly interesting given the low level of economic
69. Id.at l.
70. Id.
71. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DuTy
ORDERS IN PLACE AS OF AUGUST 9, 2004 BY COUNTRY 1-2, 9, 11-12 (2004), available at
http://info.usitc.gov/OINV/SUNSET.NSF/0a9l5ada53e192cd852566la0073de7d/96daf5a6c
0c5290985256a0a004dee7d/$FILE/orders-ctry-tbl.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) (on file
with the author). The specific numbers are as follows: Argentina, eight; Brazil, twenty;
Chile, two; Mexico, eleven; Trinidad and Tobago, one; Venezuela, one. Id.
72. Id. at 2.
73. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 25. Additional regional trade
agreements that do not provide for antidumping measures are "the European Union
(EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), which came into force in 1994 by the treaty
signed between the EU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) [and] the
Closer Economic Relations Agreement (CER) between Australia and New Zealand." Id.
74. See infra Part I.D.2.
75. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2, ch. 8, § B, art. 8.8,
available at http:/Jwww.ustr.gov/assets/Frade-Agreements[Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_
Texts/assetupload-file5454002.pdf.
76. Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 5, 1996, Can.-Chile, ch. M, art. M-01,
36 I.L.M. 1067,1143.
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integration between the two countries." During the last half of the 1990s,
trade between Canada and Chile constituted only 1.5% of Chile's foreign
trade, and less than 0.1% of Canada's.' In 2002, U.S. foreign trade
totaled 2,366,252 U.S. dollars (USD)." In the same year, trade with
Chile totaled 6,393.3 million USD, or roughly .0027% of the United
States' international trade."s Instead of using antidumping measures,
Chile and Canada protect their domestic industries through the use of
safeguard measures."' This approach provides a more economical way to
offset disruptions in the market that result from sudden import surges, as
it avoids the costs associated with the reduction of imports after the
imposition of antidumping duties as well as the vulnerability to which
02
antidumping investigations expose exporters.
77. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 27. The countries of the EU
also have abolished the use of antidumping measures in their trade agreement, but their
intra-regional trade in the last half of the 1990s was forty-four percent. Id.
78. Id.
79. CENSUS BUREAU & BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 1 exhibit 1 (2003) (figure obtained by adding 2002 totals
for exports and imports), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-
Release/2002pr/FinalRevisions_2002/02final.pdf.
80. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TRADE (IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND TRADE BALANCE)
WITH CHILE, http:/wwwv.census.govlforeign-trade/balance/c3370.html (last modified Dec.
10, 2004) (figure obtained by adding imports and exports between the United States and
Chile).
81. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 27. Safeguards avoid the
"need to prove that the imports were traded unfairly." KATHLEEN MACMILLAN &
PATRICK GRADY, Disciplining Subsidies and Antidumping, in SEATTLE AND BEYOND:
THE WTO MILLENIUM ROUND, http://www.global-economics.ca/subsidies.htm (1997).
Instead, "[aIll that has to be established is that import volumes have been so high or
increased by such an extent that they are causing serious injury to the domestic industry,"
in which case the affected country can impose a temporary import restriction. Id.
82. Jos6 M. Salazar-Xirinachs, Proliferation of Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in the
Americas: An Assessment of Key Analytical and Policy Issues, 13 J. ASIAN ECON. 181
(2002), reprinted in OAS TRADE UNIT STUDIES 12 (2002) [hereinafter Salazar-Xirinachs,
Proliferation], available at http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../
documents/eng/publications.asp; see also JOSt M. SALAZAR-XIRINACHS, IMPLICATIONS
OF PROLIFERATING SUB-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE LATIN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 17 (2001) [hereinafter SALAZAR-XIRINACHS, IMPLICATIONS],
available at http://www.pecc.org/trade/papersbangkok-2001/salazar.pdf. A recent study
published by the OAS explained that
[s]afeguards are generally considered to be a less costly import relief mechanism
than antidumping duties, because they "force" governments to address the
domestic factors that may be hindering the competitiveness of the industry
affected by increased quantities of imported goods, rather than simply assigning
the blame for an industry's hardships to the exporters from another country ....
Salazar-Xirinachs, Proliferation, supra. Additionally, the Canada-Chile FTA contains "a
side agreement on labor with enforcement provisions similar to those applicable to US-
Canada disputes in the NAFTA (i.e., noncompliance penalties may involve monetary fines
but not trade sanctions)." Free Trade Deals: Is the United States Losing Ground as Its
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b. Mercosur and the Chile-Mexico FTA
Mercosur 83 and the Chile-Mexico F[A84 are two additional examples of
Chile's apparent willingness to forego antidumping measures in its trade
agreements. Mercosur is a regional customs union that Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile and Bolivia as associate
members, signed in 1991.85 It is the world's third largest trading bloc,
86
behind NAFTA and the EU, and has a combined GDP of over 1.4
trillion dollars. 7 The member states are expected to eventually eliminate
antidumping.88
The Chile-Mexico FTA became effective on August 1, 1999.9 In
keeping with the Chilean approach to antidumping, as illustrated by its
FTA with Canada and its agreement with the member countries in
Mercosur, Chile agreed to negotiate with Mexico a bilateral abolition of
antidumping duties on imports. 90
2. The United States Maintains Antidumping Measures in Its FTAs
In addition to Chile, the United States has FTAs with four countries:
Canada, Mexico, Jordan, and Israel, all of which allow for antidumping
measures. 9' Under chapter 19 of the NAFTA, which became effective on
Trading Partners Move Ahead?: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade, House Comm. on
Ways & Means, 107th (2001) (statement of Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for
International Economics), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file=legacy/trade/
107cong/3-29-01/3-9scho.htmOO1. In 2001 testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, a senior fellow for the Institute for
International Economics argued that various countries in the Western Hemisphere view
these provisions as viable for the FTAA. Id.
83. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., 30
I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter Mercosur], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tradee.asp (last
visited Oct. 9, 2003).
84. Chile-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 1998, Chile-Mex., http://
www.sice.oas.org/trade/chmefta/indice.asp.
85. Mercosur, supra note 83.
86. DELPHI GROUP, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (CDM) PROJECT
OPPORTUNITIES IN ARGENTINA: A MARKET STUDY FOR CANADIAN COMPANIES 2
(2000), available at http://www.delphi.ca/cacbi/en/pdf/CDM-Opportunities in
Argentina.pdf.
87. LARRY BROWN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION:
THE LATIN AMERICAN MARKET 12 (2003), available at http://www.international.
fhwa.dot.gov/latinamer/freight_transp.pdf.
88. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 25.
89. Chile-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, supra note 84.
90. See SALAZAR-XIRINACHS, IMPLICATIONS, supra note 82, at 6.
91. United States-Jordan: Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000,
U.S.-Jordan, LEXSEE 2000 U.S.T. LEXIS annex 2.3 § 2(a)(ii); North American Free
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January 1, 1994, the United States, Mexico, and Canada retained their
domestic antidumping laws. While there has been some discussion as to
the possibility of replacing NAFTA's antidumping provisions with
antitrust remedies, this prospect is not widely regarded as a likely
alternative 3
Like NAFTA and the Chile-United States FTA, the Jordan-United
States FTA94 and the Israel-United States FTA95 are both largely
recognized for their non-economic benefits.96 The United States,
Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289, 300 [hereinafter NAFTA];
Israel-United States: Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, Isr.-U.S., 24 I.LM. 643, 654.
92. NAFTA, supra note 91, pt. 7, ch. 19, art. 1902, 32 I.L.M. at 682.
93. JOHN A. RAGOSTA & JOHN R. MAGNUS, ANTIDUMPING AND ANTITRUST
REFORM IN THE NAFTA: BEYOND RHETORIC AND MISCHIEF, http://www.dbtrade.com/
publications/overview.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
94. The major sections of the Jordan-United States FTA include: tariff elimination,
which will occur over a ten-year phasing-out period; the opening of the Jordanian service
sector; intellectual property rights; trade liberalization for electronic commerce; labor
rights enforcement; labor standards improvement; the bilateral enforcement and
improvement of domestic environmental laws; and consultation and dispute resolution.
See WONG KA FU, CHINESE UNIV. OF HONG KONG, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS:
US-JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/rta/index.php?
did=12 (last visited Dec. 28, 2004). In terms of political significance, the International
Economics Department of the University of Hong Kong identified the Jordan-United
States FTA as powerful evidence of the benefits of peace and of the United States'
support of Jordan's economic reform program. Id. Predictably, however, the Jordan-
United States FTA does not include a provision that would eliminate the use of
antidumping measures.
[In summary, t]he Jordan Free Trade Agreement creates a multi-step,
transparent dispute settlement process. Any dispute that cannot be resolved
through consultation may be referred to a panel of independent experts for a
non-binding opinion. If a dispute cannot be settled after panel proceedings are
completed, the Free Trade Agreement authorizes the affected party to take any
appropriate and commensurate measure, without specifying the form that this
action should take. This process can help to ensure the efficiency and
transparency of this free trade agreement.
Id. In article 2, Trade in Goods, the Jordan-United States FTA provides that "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this Agreement, each Party shall progressively eliminate its customs
duties on originating goods of the other Party in accordance with Annex 2.1 and its
schedule to Annex 2.1." United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 91, art.
2,§ 1.
95. The Israel-United States FTA follows an approach similar to that of the Jordan-
United States FTA, with respect to antidumping. Article 19 of the Israel-United States
FTA provides for dispute resolution in the event of a discrepancy in interpretation of the
agreement, or when either country considers that the other member has violated its
obligations therein. Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement, supra note 91, art. 19, 24
I.L.M. at 664-65. Although the Israel-United States FTA does not lay out rules regarding
antidumping, it specifically states that the dispute settlement provision "shall not apply to
the imposition of antidumping... duties." Id. at 665.
96. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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however, was unwilling to forgo antidumping measures in either
agreement.97 The United States' approach to antidumping also appears
in the Uruguay Round Agreements 98 of the WTO, 99 to which Chile is also
a signatory. With respect to unfair trade practices, "[the WTO
agreement's] focus is on how governments can or cannot react to
dumping-it disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the
'Anti-dumping Agreement. ' ""0
3. A Future Case: The Free Trade Area of the Americas
The Free Trade Area of the Americas""' is a regional agreement that
contemplates trade between thirty-four countries of the Western
Hemisphere, including the United States and Canada.1°2 If finalized, "it
97- See supra notes 94-95.
98. 19 U.S.C. § 3532 (2000).
99. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis/_e/tife/facts5_e.htm (last visited Dec. 23,
2004). The WTO is the successor to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);
however, GATT, which because of the Uruguay Round Agreements, was updated in 1994,
"still exists as the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods." Id.
100. WORLD TRADE ORG., ANTI-DUMPING, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
adp-e/adp-e.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). The WTO and the GATT contain a range of
special provisions in favor of developing countries. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 99.
These special provisions include:
longer time periods for implementing Agreements and commitments,
measures to increase trading opportunities for these countries,
provisions requiring all WTO members to safeguard the trade interests of
developing countries,
support to help developing countries build the infrastructure for WTO work,
handle disputes, and implement technical standards, and
provisions related to Least-Developed country (LDC) Members.
WORLD TRADE ORG., WORK ON SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL PROVISIONS,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/dev-special-differential-provisions e-test-jp
-july02.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). See also WTO Agreement, supra note 11, art. XV.
In particular, article XV, "Developing Country Members," of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT provides that where antidumping measures
would having a bearing on the "essential interests" of developing country members, the
initiating country must first consider the possibility of constructive remedies. Id. The
United States approved article VI of the GATE-an annex to the WTO Agreemcnt-
under 19 U.S.C. § 3511. 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (2000). The World Bank classifies Chile as a
developing country. See THE WORLD BANK GROUP, DATA & STATISTICS, http://
www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm#LAC (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
101. The official website of the Free Trade Area of the Americas is http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/alca e.asp.
102. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Announces
Regional Seminar on the FTAA: Unique Opportunity for Public Participation (July 2,
2002), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/PressReleases/2002/July/U.S.-Announces
_RegionalSeminar on theFTAA.html.
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will create the largest free trade zone in history."'' 3 Ongoing negotiations
have involved much discussion as to the topic of antidumping policy, and
contention in this area has been blamed for the delay in finalizing the
agreement.""4  Provided the prospective member countries come to
agreement by the January 1, 2005 deadline, Chile will be the vice-chair to
the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement. 0 5 Thus, the United
States' approach to antidumping in its future trade with Chile will have
certain relevance in this regional trade agreement, which the current U.S.
administration eagerly hopes will go into effect by the quickly
approaching deadline.
0 6
II. ARE THE U.S. ANTIDUMPING STATUTES A BAR TO FREE TRADE
WITH CHILE?
As of August 2004, the United States had 359 antidumping actions in
place. 1 7  Only two of these were against Chile, indicating that
antidumping measures may be unnecessary in the U.S.-Chile FTA."'"
More importantly, these numbers suggest that the negative effects of the
U.S. antidumping laws on trade with Chile may outweigh the protective
benefits of their application.'09
A. Are the Antidumping Statutes a Necessary Fair Trade Tool or Just a
One-Sided Protectionist Measure in Disguise?"
Nobel Prize winner and renowned economist, Joseph Stiglitz, attacked
the popular "fairness" justification for antidumping legislation by noting
the other side of the "fairness" equation."' He argued that
103. Id.
104. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE
AMERICAS: STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND MAJOR POLICY ISSUES 3-4 (2003), available
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9266.pdf.
105. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMS., DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, at http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/ngroups/ngdisp-e.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). See generally SUMMIT OF THE
AMERICAS CTR., COMMENTARIES, at http://www.americasnet.net/trade/commentaries.
htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005), for information on the deadline.
106. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
107. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 71, at 12.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. At a hearing before the Federal Trade Commission, Joseph Stiglitz commented
that dumping law is "'defined according to peculiar accounting principles that make it a
disguised form of protectionism."' Letter from Terrence P. Stewart, Managing Partner,
Stewart & Stewart, to Donald S. Clark, Office of the Secretary, Federal Trade
Commission (Jan. 29, 1996), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/stew.stew.htm (citation
omitted).
111. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Dumping on Free Trade: The U.S. Import Trade Laws, 64 S.
ECON. J. 402, 402 (1997).
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"[p]erpetuating unfair trade laws that are themselves unfair ... imposes
substantial burdens on our consumers and on our most efficient
exporters while protecting our least efficient import-competing firms.
'11 2
The figures that support Stiglitz's argument are impressive."' As stated
above, the U.S. ITC concluded that the economic costs of antidumping
legislation amounted to $1.6 billion per year.114 Furthermore, while
domestic producers in protected industries experienced an increase in
profits and wages of approximately $658 million during that time,
unprotected firms and workers suffered a loss of approximately $1.85
billion.' l A second study "estimate[d] that the collective net economic
welfare cost in 1993 of [antidumping and countervailing duty] orders to
be $4 billion."'1 6 The study took into account the welfare consequences
that arise "when a foreign firm responds to an [antidumping] order by
raising its U.S. price of the subject import, [which results in] an income
transfer (i.e., an economic welfare gain) from the U.S. economy to the
foreign firm. 1 1 7  The study concluded that "the U.S. [antidumping/
countervailing duty] laws are poised to become the costliest, in terms of
net economic welfare, of U.S. import restraint programs. '1 8  Deputy
Treasury Secretary, Kenneth Dam, echoed Stiglitz's argument, stating
that "the antidumping proceeding always has been and is increasingly a
protectionist device, as various Congresses have amended the underlying
statute to make the proceeding and remedy more effective."'1 9 If the
U.S. antidumping laws do not tend to promote fairness in the larger
(economic) sense of the word, then can one not deduce that they merely
serve protectionist interests and therefore contradict the fundamental
concept of free trade?"2
In terms of global perception of the U.S. antidumping laws-an
important concern considering the United States' FTAA ambitions-
112. Id. at 418.
113. See ELWELL, supra note 58, at 10.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Michael P. Gallaway et al., Welfare Costs of U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws, 49 J. INT'L ECON. 211, 211 (1999).
117. Id. at 221.
118. Id. at 236.
119. KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME 148 (2001); STUART
ANDERSON, UNCLEAN HANDS: AMERICA'S PROTECTIONIST POLICIES,
http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/freetotrade/chap6.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2004) (citation
omitted). The Washington, D.C. based public interest group, Consumers for World
Trade, noted that "'[a]ntidumping laws as they are written and implemented are
protectionist and anti-consumer." Id.
120. CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS 614, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbooklhblO8/hblO8-61.pdf
(last visited Dec. 22, 2004).
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"many U.S. trading partners (especially the developing nations) view
U.S. trade remedy laws as hidden protection because they are regarded
as being biased towards findings in favor of U.S. industries." '' This is
not surprising given that the Department of Commerce, in determining
whether a product has been dumped, "rules in favor of the U.S. industry
in 95% of the cases.' 2   Furthermore, "almost the entirety of [U.S.-
initiated] antidumping investigations involve the application of
provisional duties.' ' 23 Beneath this fact lies the disconcerting assertion,
which appeared in a recent report for Congress, that most economic
analysts believe "that a series of amendments to U.S. antidumping law
during the 1970s facilitated a major increase in the likelihood of
achieving a successful antidumping finding.' 2 4 Such changes included
"use of sales below cost as a measure of dumping, establishment of strict
and shortened time limits on cases, a shift of investigation power from
the Department of Treasury to the Department of Commerce, and a
lowering of the threshold for assessing imports' role in harming a
domestic industry. 12'  The report noted that there was indeed a
substantial increase in affirmative findings with respect to the
antidumping cases that came after these changes. 26 Those satisfied with
the screening process might argue that this is a testament to its efficacy;
however, assuming that the process is not seriously flawed, a position
countered below, the fact remains that such statistics have a profound
effect on all current or potential trade partners.
2 7
121. Colin A. Carter, Why Is There So Much Interest in Trade Remedy Laws, AGRIC.
& RESOURCE ECON. UPDATE, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/outreach/areupdatepdfs/UpdateV5N3/N3-l.pdf.
Where a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be sold in
the United States at less than its fair value and a domestic industry is either
materially injured, threatened with material injury, or suffers retarded growth as
a result, then an antidumping duty will be imposed on such merchandise in
addition to any other duty imposed.
The purpose of the antidumping statute is to protect domestic manufacturing
against foreign manufacturers who sell at less than fair market value, thereby
remedying international price discrimination to prevent injury to domestic
industries. As such, these laws are remedial not punitive; seek[ing] to be fair,
rather than to build bias into the calculation of dumping margins.
21A AM. JUR. 2D Customs Duties and Import Regulations § 39 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
122. Carter, supra note 121, at 10.
123. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 16 n.6. (last visited Oct. 9,
2003).
124. ELWELL, supra note 58, at 6-7.
125. Id. at 7.
126. Id.
127. See Carter, supra note 121, at 10.
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Several arguably flawed aspects of the United States' antidumping
investigation process, which could be at the root of the apparent bias, are
related to the pricing system.1 8 For example, if a home market index is
not available to establish the "normal" price of the imported product in
question, the Department of Commerce will use a third country index or
a constructed value index, which, in practice, often becomes theS • 129
measuring device. The problem with the constructed value index is
that the data is often derived from the arguably partial antidumping
• - 130
petition of the domestic complainant. The skewed nature of such
information was confirmed by an extensive Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development study of the antidumping cases in
Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States, which
"found that 90% of the cases where imports were determined to be
dumped under existing rules would not have been questioned as posing a
predatory threat under these same countries' antitrust (or competition)
laws.'
131
Supporters of antidumping legislation maintain that the United States'
trade laws are generally essential to securing domestic rights and
interests.1 32  Perhaps the most prominent argument in favor of
antidumping laws has to do with "predatory pricing."' Predatory
128. ELWELL, supra note 58, at 6-8.
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 7-8. Constructed value indexes often fail to incorporate low profit sales in
the domestic market, which ultimately inflates the imputed dumping margin. Id. at 7.
This is one of the reasons why the U.S. antidumping investigation system has been accused
of having "a built-in asymmetry that biases it toward a finding that dumping has
occurred," and helps to explain why there is substantial criticism of the antidumping laws
as being protectionist measures. Id.
132. See Thomas R. Howell, Cartels and Dumping: A Response, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
297-98 (2001) (discussing the need for antidumping legislation to counter the predatory
trade practices of trade cartels, and arguing that antidumping laws are essential to a liberal
trade system).
133. ELWELL, supra note 58, at 5. An additional, narrowly-drawn argument in favor
of antidumping legislation is based on the "new trade theory" or "strategic trade theory."
Id. at 5-6. This theory is founded on research that addresses the international competition
between a few firms, as opposed to the rivalry that exists between an exporting and
importing country with respect to the exchange of a particular good. Id. at 5. The theory
holds that among the few firms, a
strategic interdependence [will arise] such that pricing, investment, and output
decisions by one firm will strongly affect similar decisions by others in the group.
[As such, t]he firm that can move first to exploit sale economies and learning
curve advantages can find itself in a position to earn extra-normal returns to the
benefit of itself and the wider economy [and]
* .. [a]ntidumping actions could help capture these benefits as they work to help
the home firm and deter the foreign competitor.
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pricing is monopolistic behavior whereby a producer seeks to drive all of
its competition out of the market by using low prices. 34 Those in favor of
antidumping measures argue that this practice ultimately reduces overall
economic welfare because eventually, once it has eliminated competing
producers, the monopoly will raise its prices.'35 This concern becomes
heightened in the context of foreign predators, as the economic gains
from such practice would flow back to the predator's home economy.136
Additionally, "because domestic labor is not internationally mobile,
there are likely to be more adjustment problems and more employment
mismatches than if the output source had shifted within the domestic
market rather than abroad.',
3 7
Economic analysts consider the threat of predatory pricing to be highly
unlikely.1 3  They attribute the "very low probability" of successful
predatory pricing to the lengthy and expensive period of predation and
the substantial challenge of fending off new predators. A 2001 report
published by the United Nations corroborated this argument, as it found
that historical evidence and recent analysis both confirmed that the link
between antidumping and predatory behavior was "weak at best.', 40 The
United Nations report points to the attenuated relationship between the
system used for determining whether a product had been dumped and
the "actual existence of price discrimination of sales below cost."''
Furthermore, based on the "results of an empirical study for the
Id. at 5-6. As with the predatory pricing argument, however, opponents of antidumping
measures point out that the presence of the conditions which would allow these positive
effects is unlikely and thus find little merit in the "new trade theory" argument for
antidumping measures. Id. at 6.






140. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 21; see also MACMILLAN &
GRADY, supra note 81. The authors stated that "[tihe truth is that few antidumping
actions can be justified on the grounds of predatory pricing or import restrictions in the
exporter's home market. Most are examples of plain old-fashioned protectionism in
action." Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-
91 (1986). Justice Powell stated that
[a] predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. Any agreement to
price below the competitive level requires the conspirators to forgo profits that
free competition would offer them. The forgone profits may be considered an
investment in the future. For the investment to be rational, the conspirators
must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly
profits, more than the losses suffered.
Id. at 588-89.
141. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 21.
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [sic] . . . 'it
turns out that in the overwhelming majority of antidumping cases that
resulted in remedies, there was no plausible threat of monopolization in
the importing market."
142
B. Do the Drawbacks of Antidumping Measures in the Chile-United
States FTA Outweigh the Questionable Benefits?
1. Economic Considerations
Given the broad support for the U.S.-Chile FTA, specifically with
respect to Chile's desirability as a trading partner, it would be in the
United States' best interest not to traumatize Chile's economy with the
costs associated with antidumping measures. 43  The United Nations
noted that it is not unusual for the cost of a legal defense for a U.S.
exporter involved in an antidumping suit to exceed $500,000 to
$1 million. 4 The United Nations further noted that "[a]t such costs,
small exporting firms in developing countries are hardly able to take
advantage of the procedural and substantive rights theoretically available
to them. 14'5 The United States must consider that, even though the FTA
aims to ensure free trade bctween the countries, if our antidumping
investigations overburden the Chilean economy, Chile will be less likely
to export to us for fear of incurring antidumping duties.' 46 Additionally,
if our trade relations sour as a result of antidumping duties, Chile might
142. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ANTIDUMPING ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
AROUND THE WORLD: AN UPDATE 3 n.8 (2001) (citation omitted), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/28xx/doc2895/Antidumping.pdf. This report provides the
following argument in favor of antidumping:
Some supporters of antidumping law have put forward a mechanism by which
such laws can benefit the United States economically even in the absence of
predatory pricing. If the reason for the dumping is that the foreign exporter has
a monopoly (or substantial market power) in its home market because that
market is protected by trade barriers but has no such market power in the United
States, the antidumping law may create pressure in the exporter's home market
to eliminate the trade barriers that allow that market power. If the country
eliminates the barriers, both the United States and the exporter's home country
gain. If it does not eliminate them, however, both countries lose economically as
a result of the antidumping law. In any event, U.S. antidumping policy makes no
attempt to distinguish such cases when deciding whether to impose antidumping
duties.
Id. at 4 n.10.
143. See supra Part I.B.2.
144. Impact of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Actions, U.N. TDBOR, at 29
n.17, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.1/EM.14/2 (2000), available at http:I/www.unctad.org/en/
docs/cleml4d2.en.pdf.
145. Id.
146. See infra Part II.B.1.
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decline to import our products and instead seek them from other
countries. 14  A second economic concern related to the United States'
use of antidumping measures against Chile is the possibility that Chile
will impose similar restrictions upon U.S. imports. This "golden rule"
argument must be considered in light of the United States' frequent use
of antidumping measures. 49  For example, in 2000, the United States
147. For example, the fact that the FTA between Chile and Canada contains no
antidumping measure may make Canada a more desirable trading partner. See supra Part
I.D.l.a.
148. See CATO INST., supra note 120, at 618. A 2001 report provided proof that
antidumping measures against the United States have been increasing:
TABLE 5: RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE
ANTIDUMPING MEASURES THEY MAINTAIN AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES









South Korea 3 1
Argentina 2 1
Israel 2 0
New Zealand I I
Venezuela 0 2
Total 65 57
RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING
MEASURES THEY MAINTAIN AGAINST THE UNITED STATES PER
$10 BILLION OF U.S. EXPORTS
Country December 31, 1999 December 31, 1994
South Africa 17.2 9.6
India 2.0 4.5
Colombia 11.3 10.7










Id. at 51-52 tbls. 5, 6 (footnotes omitted).
149. See ELWELL, supra note 58, at 2-3; see also Proceedings of the Second Annual
Legal & Policy Issues in the Americas, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 82 (2001) [hereinafter
2005]
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accounted for more than twenty-six percent of world-wide antidumping150
measures. As the Cato Institute Handbook for Congress points out,
"foreign copycat laws now target U.S. exporters with depressing
frequency.'. During the latter half of the 1990s, "the United States was
the third leading victim of worldwide antidumping actions."1 52 If we want
Chile to play fair, we must do so as well; otherwise, our antidumping
legislation could come back to harm us.
2. Social and Environmental Considerations
In addition to economic arguments, social norms and environmental
concerns also form the basis of theories on why or why not antidumping
measures are appropriate for the U.S.-Chile FTA."' Some proponents of
antidumping measures are concerned that without such measures,
domestic importers will take advantage of the less stringent
environmental and labor laws of the exporting developing country.'
This argument does not provide a sound basis for addressing dumping,
environmental, or labor concerns, as it pits efficiency against fairness in
claiming that the exporting country will not be deterred by the threat of
costly antidumping legislation and will therefore disregard important
environmental and social considerations in order to produce and export
at a lower cost. 156 A more appropriate and direct approach to addressing
these concerns is to include specific compliance provisions, with
mutually-agreed upon standards.17 This is the approach that the U.S.-
Proceedings]. In the panel discussion, Kathy-Ann Brown, Legal Adviser in International
Trade for Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery, id. at 82 n.1, stated that
[a] growing number of countries are increasingly resorting to antidumping
measures as a disguised protectionist tool in contrast to a legitimate measure to
redress unfair trade. The gains which should accrue from the liberalization
process are thereby effectively denied. U.S. exports will increasingly be the
target of such measures. Over time, the U.S. administration is likely to see the
wisdom of enhancing antidumping disciplines -adopting, at least, a minimalist
perspective.
Id. at 98.
150. ELWELL, supra note 58, at 2-3.
151. CATO INST., supra note 120, at 618.
152. Id.; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 142, at 51. In 1999, Mexico and
Canada, our partners in NAFTA, ranked number one and two respectively. Id.
153. See CATO INST., supra note 120, at 618. The Cato report further states that "[t]he
prospects for reform here and abroad, however, are dimmed by vehement congressional
opposition to any trade negotiations that might 'weaken' U.S. trade laws." Id. The
handbook further states that because of antidumping, "the United States could ultimately
pay a grievously heavy price in lost opportunities to open markets around the world." Id.
154. See ELWELL, supra note 58, at 11-12.
155. See id. This is particularly the case with respect to child labor. Id.
156. Id. at 12.
157. See text accompanying notes 51-53.
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Chile FTA took, illustrating that such concerns do not lend convincing
support for antidumping measures in the FTA.
5 8
3. FTAA Considerations
Part of the United States' motivation for entering into the FTA with
Chile was that doing so would "'raise the bar for the Free Trade Area of
the Americas negotiations.""" For the United States, the FTAA is
important because "the Western hemisphere is a large and growing
market"' O6 and, as U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick noted,
"[A]s of February 2002, [the United States] was a member of only three
of the 130 free trade agreements in force around the world, and ... as a
result, 'U.S. businesses are losing marketshare. ' ,161 In a 2001 panel
discussion, Kathy Brown, legal adviser for Caribbean Regional
Negotiation Machinery, stated that
[i]n a free trade environment, it has been calculated utilizing
several different models that our relationship with Latin
America could double two-way trade within five to seven years
of the signing of a comprehensive agreement. So, [an
agreement with Latin America and the Caribbean, namely the
FTAA,] is a tremendous thing.
The U.S.-Chile FTA will demonstrate to other prospective FTAA
members that the United States is committed to regional trade
liberalization in the Western hemisphere. FTAA countries will want to
share in the vast economic gains that are expected to follow from
expanded trade between Latin America and the United States."'
Already, "[slince opening its markets, Chile has doubled the size of its
economy and halved its number of impoverished citizens. ' 4 Those who
support the FTAA see Chile as a compelling example for other Latin
158. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2, ch. 18, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assetsfTrade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile -FTA/Final-Texts/asset-upl
oadfile535_3989.pdf; id. ch. 19, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/Chile FTA/FinalTexts/asset-uploadjfile482_4013.pdf (stating that
the United States-Chile FTA included provisions for labor and environment per chapters
18 and 19).
159. Press Release, supra note 47 (quoting John Murphy, U.S. Chamber Vice
President, Western Hemisphere Affairs); see also Geri Smith & Paul Magnusson, Chile: A
Giant Step Toward Free Trade Across the Americas?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, June 16, 2003,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_24/c3837072_mzO15.htm
160. Christopher Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of Regionalism:
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 5
(2002).
161. Id. (citation omitted).
162. Proceedings, supra note 149, at 90.
163. Smith & Magnusson, supra note 159.
164. Id.
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American countries."6 However, the effectiveness of the FTA, as a
means of motivating FTAA countries, will hinge on whether the United
States can demonstrate its ability to trade fairly, in light of its
antidumping measures.16 Indeed, "antidumping actions . . .will be
sensitive in the FIAA negotiations.'
167
A study conducted by the Congressional Budget Office in 2001
"show[ed] that the United States continues to be a very active user of
antidumping measures and those measures continue to create a
significant and enduring impediment to trade in the targeted products.
1 6 8
A recent report presented to Congress that considered the United States'
active use of antidumping measures noted that "[t]his [continued use of
antidumping measures] is in sharp contrast to the nation's otherwise
strong advocacy of free trade.''169  Not surprisingly, an apparent
correlation exists between the amount of antidumping measures the
United States imposes upon a country and how much we import from
them.
7 0
For example, in 2000, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
Japan ranked highest for targets of U.S. antidumping measures (forty
165. Id.
166. TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR., supra note 5. This report argues that "antidumping
spoils the critical driving force in every integration process." Id.
167. WEINTRAUB, supra note 18. An additional concern in F[AA negotiations
relates to coordination between the FTAA and the other trade agreements that are
already in place in the Western Hemisphere-a matter addressed by the Inter-American
Development Bank:
The FTAA faces a difficult job in defining the terms of coexisting with the
spaghetti-bowl of trade agreements in the hemisphere. How can countries deal
with current and potential market access conditions for the goods that will
benefit from this complex set of trade agreements, each with its own tariff
reduction schemes, rules of origin, and technical, procedural and even
documental systems? Indeed, FTAA negotiators have a full plate before them.
However, three scenarios are most likely: (i) the FTAA negotiates its own
tariff elimination program, its own set of rules of origin and its own
requirements, while exporters decide on a case-by-case basis whether to opt for
FTAA treatment or for treatment in accordance with another agreement; (ii) the
FrAA supersedes pre-existing agreements, making FTAA criteria the only valid
ones; (iii) the FTAA does not step in to regulate tariffs, origin or procedural
requirements among countries that already have a trade agreement in force.
Each option has advantages and disadvantages. Still, if the FTAA manages to
rationalize the spaghetti bowl, it will have achieved something that was not even
on the menu.
The Spaghetti Bowl of Trade Liberalization, LATIN AM. ECON. POLICIES 2002, at 2, 7,
available at http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubN-19E.pdf.
168. ELWELL, supra note 58, at 3.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 13.
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and thirty-eight, respectively). In the same year, U.S. imports from the
PRC totaled 100,018,429 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)12 and those from
Japan totaled 146,479,404 (in thousands of U.S. dollars).173 Chile, on the
other hand, was the subject of two antidumping measures in 2000."7 That
year, U.S. imports from Chile totaled 3,269,035 (in thousands of U.S.
dollars) .17 These facts take on a special significance with respect to the
FTAA, considering that "[t]he United States' abundant anti-dumping
legislation is currently seen as the biggest hurdle to finalizing
negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas.' ' 76 The economic
and political arguments for not utilizing antidumping measures in U.S.
trade with Chile are strong, while the social and environmental
arguments in favor of utilizing them are unconvincing. On the balance,
the negative effects of antidumping measures in the context of the U.S.-
Chile FTA outweigh the possible justifications for using them. 77
III. TRADE WITH CHILE COULD BE FREE AND FAIR
There are a number of ways in which the United States could ensure
that trade with Chile under the FTA will be more free and fair for both
countries. First, although possibly delaying the date upon which the FTA
goes into effect, the parties could amend the agreement to eliminate the
use of the antidumping statutes altogether."' Alternatively, the parties
could amend the agreement after the effective date. While the
abolishment of antidumping measures in the U.S.-Chile FTA is unlikely,
strong support for such action still exists on both sides, increasing the
number of procedural challenges that would accompany the suspension
of certain trade laws in the agreement. 79 Further, proponents of both
arguments must look to the Canada-Chile FTA and consider, if Canada
171. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 142, at 48 tbl.4.
172. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. IMPORTS FROM CHINA FROM 1999 TO 2003 BY 5-
DIGIT END-USE CODE, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/
imports/c5700.html (last modified June 14, 2004).
173. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. IMPORTS FROM JAPAN FROM 1999 TO 2003 BY 5-
DIGIT END-USE CODE, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/
imports/c5880.html (last modified June 14, 2004).
174. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 142, at 48 tbl.4.
175. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. IMPORTS FROM CHILE FROM 1999 TO 2003 BY 5-
DIGIT END-USE CODE, http:flwww.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/
imports/c3370.html (last modified June 14, 2004).
176. Gustavo Gonzalez, US Antidumping Laws-a Hurdle to Free Trade in the
Americas, TWN ONLINE (Apr. 27, 2001), at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/hurdle.htm.
177. See supra Parts I.B.2., II.B.
178. This is the approach taken by the Canada-Chile FTA. See TAVARES DE ARAUJO
JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 25, 27.
179. For a summary of the arguments for and against U.S. antidumping laws, see supra
Part I.C.l.b.
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thought it feasible and worthwhile to suspend antidumping laws in its
FTA with Chile, why would the same consideration not profit the United
States?' O After all, Canada and the United States have similar trade
relationships with Chile, in terms of the low quantity of Chilean imports
and minimal antidumping activity, which strengthens the possibility that
the United States could eliminate antidumping in the U.S.-Chile FTA. 8'
For example, in 1994, Canada imported 238,179 (in thousands of
Canadian dollars) in goods from Chile.18 2  To put these statistics in
perspective, in the same year Canadian imports of U.S. products totaled
137,345 (in millions of Canadian dollars) . In the ten years that
preceded the 1997 Canada-Chile FTA, Canada did not have any
antidumping measures in place against Chile."' The United States
should follow Canada's example and give serious consideration to
substituting safeguards for antidumping.Is
Furthermore, as the Canada-Chile FTA demonstrates, an isolated
suspension of antidumping laws in a particular agreement is possible;
Congress should consider this with respect to the FTAA.'86 The United
States was apparently successful during the FTA negotiations in
convincing Chilean negotiators that, given how infrequently the U.S.
imposes antidumping measures against Chile, antidumping restrictions
were a nonissue.'8 But, Chile does not seem to pose any real threat to
domestic producers; perhaps the United States had another reason for
not compromising its antidumping protection'8
Tension between the United States and Brazil is largely responsible for
delays in the FTAA negotiating process.189 Specifically, Brazil views U.S.
180. See GROCERY MFRS. OF AM. (GMA), US-CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT,
http://www.gmabrands.com/publicpolicy/docs/whitepaper.cfm?DocID=783 (last visited
Dec. 24, 2004) (recommending that "[n]egotiators should follow the Canada-Chile FTA
model and eliminate export subsidies in the US-Chile FIA"). A comprehensive answer to
this question is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, a comparative study of trade
between Chile and Canada and between Chile and the United States could illuminate the
argument against antidumping in the United States-Chile FTA.
181. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (describing U.S. imports of Chilean
products and U.S. antidumping measures imposed against Chile). For information
regarding the recent antidumping history between Chile and Canada, see U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 80.
182. STRATEGIS.GC.CA, at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc-mrkti/tdst/tdo/tdo.php (last
visited Dec. 24, 2004) (providing customized reporting of Canadian trade data).
183. Id.
184. See TAVARES DE ARAUJO JR. ET AL., supra note 67, at 11.
185. See supra 180-181 and accompanying text.
186. Canada-Chile: Free Trade Agreement, supra note 20.
187. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part II.B.2.
189. Bruner, supra note 160, at 6.
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antidumping law as an unacceptable protectionist measure.'90 This
perspective was voiced by "Brazil's Ambassador to the United States,
[when he] stated that such barriers to Brazilian exports are 'inconsistent
with the proclaimed 'free trade' rhetoric of the United States.' 19'
Knowing the importance of the antidumping issue for Brazil, perhaps the
United States sees a concession on this point as its biggest negotiating
chip-as it has not yet conceded antidumping in any of its other FTAs-
which it will cash in closer to the nearing deadline for the FTAA.
192
However, while the Bush administration might be willing to give up
antidumping in the FIAA in order to meet the 2005 deadline, those in
Congress who support these laws have made it clear that they will not
grant fast track for the FTAA if it weakens antidumping legislation.1
93
190. Id. at 25-26.
191. Id. at 26.
192. See supra Part I.D.2, for the proposition that the United States has never
conceded its antidumping laws in a FTA.
193. Senator Baucus on Protecting U.S. Laws in Trade Talks, U.S. MISSION
EUROPEAN UNION, May 7, 2001, http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/Protecting
USTradeLaws05070l.html. President Bush "and administration officials have stated they
want fast track especially to advance Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
negotiations." Id. Senator Baucus, however, in reference to demands by Brazil that the
United States change its trade law in multilateral negotiations, stated that "li]f President
Bush truly wants to win congressional support for fast track,... he should make a clear
and unambiguous statement in support of these laws and communicate this message
directly to his staff and to U.S. trading partners." Id. The letter, which was signed by
sixty-one senators, read as follows:
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to state our strong opposition to any international trade
agreement that would weaken U.S. trade laws.
Key U.S. trade laws, including antidumping law, countervailing duty law, Section
201, and Section 301, are a critical element of U.S. trade policy. A wide range of
agricultural and industrial sectors has successfully employed these statutes to
address trade problems. Unfortunately, experience suggests that many other
industries are likely to have occasion to rely upon them in future years.
Each of these laws is fully consistent with U.S. obligations under the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and other trade agreements. Moreover, these laws
actually promote free trade by countering practices that both distort trade and
are condemned by international trading rules.
U.S. trade laws provide American workers and industries the guarantee that, if
the United States pursues trade liberalization, it will also protect them against
unfair foreign trade practices and allow time for them to address serious import
surges. They are part of a political bargain struck with Congress and the
American people under which the United States has pursued market opening
trade agreements in the past.
Congress has made clear its position on this matter. In draft fast track legislation
considered in 1997, both Houses of Congress have included strong provisions
directing trade negotiators not to weaken U.S. trade laws. Congress has restated
this position in resolutions, letters, and through other means.
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Thus, domestic disagreement over the issue of U.S. trade laws could
threaten the FTAA as much as international contention on the matter.194
A more drastic and therefore less likely alternative to phasing out or
abolishing our antidumping laws in the Chile-United States FTA, and in
the FTAA, would be for the United States to revise, or eliminate all
together, their antidumping laws."' Indeed, this is the very
recommendation that the Cato Institute made in its handbook for the
108th Congress. 196  The Cato Institute argued that, even where such
action may be unilateral, "[f]ree traders should ... launch a campaign for
the . . . outright elimination of U.S. trade barriers-including the
antidumping law.'"'" Considering the numerous studies, and especially
that of the ITC, which indicate that tremendous economic losses result
from U.S. antidumping law and the relatively low level benefits of such
protection, Congress ought to give serious consideration to the possibility
of striking the antidumping laws.
1 98
Unfortunately, some of our trading partners, many of whom maintain serious
unfair trade practices, continue to seek to weaken these laws. This may simply
be posturing by those who oppose further market opening, but-whatever the
motive-the United States should no longer use its trade laws as bargaining chips
in trade negotiations nor agree to any provisions that weaken or undermine U.S.
trade laws.
We look forward to your response.
Id. But cf Richard J. Pierce, Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 735 (2000) (stating that there are non-policy reasons for which
politicians support antidumping law). Professor Richard J. Pierce argues that
[p]oliticians like antidumping law for several related reasons. First, and most
important, antidumping law permits politicians to appear to support free trade
while they preserve their discretion to engage in ad hoc protectionism at the
behest of constituencies with political clout. Second, simultaneously supporting
free trade and antidumping law allows a politician to take the rhetorical high
ground. Most people understand the value of free trade, but nobody likes
"dumping." The word conjures up an image of an evil foreign corporation that is
using the United States as a toxic waste dump. Third, few members of the
electorate are likely to do the hard work required to understand the simple
reality that the conduct that is prohibited by antidumping law is the normal,
socially beneficial conduct of any participant in a competitive market and,
conversely, that antidumping law is just as protectionist as high tariffs and low
import quotas.
As of 1999, over 200 U.S. markets were affected by antidumping orders. There is
reason to believe that a high proportion of those markets, like the ferrosilicon
market, were cartelized with the aid of antidumping orders.
Id.
194. See Pierce, supra note 193, at 735.
195. CATO INST., supra note 120, at 618.
196. Id. at 613, 618.
197. Id. at 615.
198. See supra notes 22-23, 116 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, in evaluating the damaging costs that developing
countries such as Chile suffer in antidumping litigation, even when no
duty is imposed, a third and more viable way in which the United States
could increase the likelihood of more free and fair trade with Chile
would be to make certain changes to the administrative processes
involved in antidumping investigations. '99 First, in accordance with the
1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Act, the screening process
could be reformed to give a more scrutinizing review of complaints• 200
against developing countries. Secondly, as suggested in the above-
mentioned 2002 report for Congress, the current pricing system, which
has been accused of being largely to blame for the international
community's perception of United States' biases in antidumping
investigations, could be amended to ensure a more accurate and fair
determination of whether a product has been dumped."'
IV. CONCLUSION
While trade with Chile might not be completely free or fair, the FTA
brings us closer to these goals. The anticipated increase in trade between
the two countries will certainly get the attention of Chile's watchful
neighbors. In addition, changes in the United States' approach to
antidumping would result in significant economic gains for the United
States, while altering the world's perception that the United States' trade
law is inherently biased. As the member countries look ahead to
ratification of the FTAA, these considerations and what their
implementation could say to hesitant members in terms of the
desirability of having the United States as a trading partner, deserve the
serious attention of our lawmakers.
V. ADDENDUM
The Chile-U.S. FTA became effective January 1, 2004.202 The Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative reported that "[iun the three months
following the entry into force of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
total U.S. exports to Chile increased by 24 percent compared to the same
period of 2003, growing from $617.29 million to $766.79 million., 23 The
199. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
200. WTO Agreement, supra note 11, art. XV.
201. See supra Part II.A.
202. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE U.S.-CHILE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: AN EARLY RECORD OF SUCCESS, http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/
FactSheets/2004/rheU.S.ChileFreeTrade-Agreement AnEarlyRecord ofSuccess.
html (June 6, 2004).
203. Id. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative noted significant increases in the
exportation of "construction equipment[], medical equipment, and paper." Id.
2005]
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Central Bank of Chile recorded a 12.1 percent growth in exports to the
United States during the first quarter of 2004, totaling 1.17 billion
USD .204
As of February 24, 2005, the FTAA had not been signed.20 ' The Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative commented that
[t]he FTAA remains a priority for the United States and is an
important part of our global, regional and bilateral trade
agenda to open markets and level the playing field for
American farmers, workers, businesses and consumers and in
this specific case to promote economic growth, development
integration throughout the hemisphere.2 °6
The United States and Brazil, co-chairs to the FTAA, are scheduled to
207
meet again in late March, 2005.
204. Id. Fifty percent of Chile's exports to the United States consisted of goods
processed from natural resources, 39.6% of the exports were natural resources, and 10.4%
were industrial products. Id.
205. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS
TELECONFERENCE CALL WITH RICHARD MILLS, ASSISTANT US TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE FOR MEDIA AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, http://www.ustr.govl
DocumentLibrary/Transcripts/2005/Februaryflranscript-ofPressTeleconferenceCall_
withRichardMills,_AssistantUSTrade.Representativejfor.MediaPublicAffairs.htm
I (Feb. 24, 2005).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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